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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to renew a judgment 
against the defendants which the latter allege is out-
lawed by the Statute of Lirnitations. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was originally submitted by 
Stipulation to the pre-trial judge for disposition. 
Judgment finally resulted from plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment at which time a verdict and judg-
ment was granted to defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment 
and judgment in his favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff obtained judgment on September 
15., 1949., on three notes executed by the defendants. 
On April 18., 1950 the defendants, in order to release 
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a lien on real estate entered into an acknowledgment 
of and agreement to pay the obligation and did make 
payment thereafter in the amount of $450.00 1 nota-
tions of said payments being made on the acknowledg-
ment. (Tr. 4-6). This last payment was made on 
October 10, 1950. On February 51 1958 an action 
was filed to renew the original judgment which was 
more than eight years after the judgment was obtain-
ed but less than eight years after the acknowledgment 
and payment. The defendant then raised the question 
of the Statute of Limitations as a defense. 
At Pre-trial on October 14., 19601 the 
Court upon the stipulation of counsel agreed to decide 
the issue forthwith but gave counsel for defendant 
and respondent time to file a brief. No less than 
nine written requests and three personal visits were 
made to the Court IJ:# the defendants counsel in an 
effort to get a decision. Finally three years and 
-3-
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eight months later the Court rendered a decision upon 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING AS 
p_, MATTER OF LAW THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMIT-
ATIONS FOUND IN 78-12-22 WAS TOLLED BY A 
WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND PAYMENT ON 
THE JUDG1V1ENT 
The Utah Statute of Limitations relating to 
judgments is Section 78-12-22, UCA 1953, which is 
set out below. 
''An action upon a judgment or decree of any 
Court of the United States or of any state or territory 
within the United States. " 
Appellant admits that there is a split of 
authority as to whether or not a judgment is taken 
without the Statute of Limitations by an acknowledgment 
and payment thereon. However, it does submit that 
r 
its position is the strongest of the majority rule; strong-
est in that some jurisdictions allow the tolling with part 
-4-
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payment, others with written acknowledgment. In this 
instance we find both a written acknowledgment and 
substantial payments made over a period of five 
months. Appellant further contends that the majority 
opinion furthers the cause of justice and public policy 
more than the minority view expressed by the respon-
dent. 
The tolling of the Statute of Limitations by 
part payment and written acknowledgment was known 
at common law as it evidenced by VoL, 34, Am. Jur. 
Section 333, Page 262. 
"The effect of part payment in taking a case 
out of the operation of the Statute of Limitations or 
in enlarging the time during which an action may be 
brought, is not derived from statutory provisions but 
results from the decision of the Courts. Although no 
provision was made either in the Act of James I or in 
Lord Tenterden Pet with respect to the effects of part 
-5-
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payment on the OfE ration of the Statute of Limit-
ations, a judicial exception was engrafted thereon 
at an early date, to the effect that a part payment of 
a debt or obligation will take it out of the operation 
of the statute, and in the absence of a statutory 
modification or change this is the generally prevail-
ing rule in this country. '' 
It is therefore apparent that the absence 
of any statute in the State of Utah specifically Qncom-
passing judgments within this doctrine of limitations 
is not fatal to appellants position; that this rule pre-
vailed at common law and prevails now in the majo-
rity of the States in the Union. Not that it hasn 1t 
been interpreted differently in various jurisdictions 
as a result of statutes and judicial decisions, but 
that the existence of this doctrine is justified in 
all jurisdictions except those containing express 
statutory enactments against it. 
-6-
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Appellant cites the annotations in 45 A LR 2d 
970 as containing representative decisions from the 
different jurisdictions. Two of the many directly in 
point are cited below: 
The California case of Wilson v. Walters 
(1944) 66 Cal. App. 2d 1, 151 P. 2685 contained in 
the ALR citation was an action to renew a judgment 
and concerned a series of payments together with a 
letter stating it was impossible to make payment 
on the matter. The Court held: 
nit is a question of law as to whether an 
acknowledgment in writing is sufficient to 
toll the statute. " Sterling v. Title Insur-
ance Co., 53 Cal. App. 2d 736, 740., 128 P. 
2d 31, 34. 
In that case in discussing the essentials of an acknow-
ledgment, it is stated: 
"The essentials of a sufficient acknowledg-
ment have been frequently stated and were 
well expressed in Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Prosser. 898, 122 Cal. App. 413 at page 
415, 52 P. 836, 837, 55 P 145 as follows: 
-7-
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'The distinct and unqualified admission of 
an existing debt., contained in a writing., 
signed by the party to be charged., and with-
out intimation of an intent to refuse payment 
thereof, suffices to establish the debt to 
which the contract relates as a continuing 
contract and to interrupt the running of the 
Statute of Limitations against the same. 
From such an acknowledgment the law 
implies a promise to pay. 1 '' 
---'Applying the rule it will be seen that r 
the defendant's letter definitely and unqua-
lifiedly admits the debt and that there is 
no intimation in it of an intent to refuse 
payment. Therefore., the effect of the cor- ' 
respondence was to waive so much of the 
period of limitations as had theretofore run 
in favor of the defendants. From the date 
of the letter it becomes manifest that the 
action was brought in time." Vassere v. 
Jorger, 10 Cal. 2d 689., 692, 76 P. 2d 656; 
Southern Pacific Company v. Prosser, 
Supra.'' 
In the instant case we have an agreement 
signed by Emmett D. Ford on the 18th day of April., 
1950, which is much stronger than a mere letter 
acknowledging the debt as existed in the above Cali-
fornia case. This agreement together with payments 
-8-
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made during 1950 and 1951 in the amount of at least 
$450.00 appear to be sufficient to invoke the rule of 
the above case which is in the California jurisdiction 
and which jurisdiction has a statute similar to that of 
ours in Utah. 
A similar finding was reached by the IVIon-
tana Court in the case of Dodge v. Simon (1942) 1 113 
Montana 536 1 129 P. 2d 224. It was recognized by 
the Court that the Statute of Limitations upon a decree 
quieting title to real estate, having the effect of a 
judgment, was tolled by an acknowledgment of the 
existence of the judgment unsatisfied made in open 
court, the court stating., with reference to its appli-
cation of the majority rule respecting the tolling of 
a statute upon judgment for the recovery of money., 
that it could see no reason why the rule should not 
be applied to judgment for recovery of possession of 
real property, as well. 
-9-
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Quoting from the court directly: 
"While there is divergency of views of the 
question, the cases holding that a statute 
limiting the time of effectiveness of a judg-
ment may be tolled by acknowledgment of 
a judgment seem to establish the majority 
rule, and which we follow. While the cases 
cited in the annotations above referred to 
deal with judgments for the recovery of 
money, we can see no reason why the rule 
should not be applied to judgment for recovery 
of possession of real property. 11 (emphasis 
added) 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT 
SECTION 78-12-44 UCA EXTENDED THE PERIOD 
DURING WHICH A NEW ACTION COULD BE FILED ON 
THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT. 
Section 78-12-44, U.C.A ... 1953, represents 
a statute which the appellant alleges was either not 
considered or was misconstrued. 
"Section 78-12-44. In any case founded 
on contract, when any part of the principal 
or interest shall have been paid or an 
acknowledgment of an existing liability 
debt or claim, or any promise to pay the 
same shall have been made, an action may 
be brought within the period prescribed for 
the same after such payment acknowledg-
ment or promise; but such acknowledgment 
-10-
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or prom-ise must be in writing signed by the 
party to .be charged thereby. When a right 
of action is barred by the provision of any 
: statut~, it shall be unavailable either as a 
cause of action or ground of defense." 
. Appellant submits that the crucial wording of 
the statute as it relates to -this case are the first six 
words., "In any case founded on contract." {emphasis 
added) A forced and strained interpretation is certainly 
necessary to arrive -at the conclusion that these words 
do not include a definite contract in the form of promis-
sory notes which were reduced to judgment. The better 
reasoning leads one to the easily managable and satisfy-
ing determination oi the Iowa Court, ''that where a 
contract is enforced byjudgment, although it enters 
into and becomes a part of the judgment, that judgment 
is .not the obligation of the contract but is the authorized 
power under which those antecedent obligations are to be 
enforced." Spratt v. Reid (Iowa) 3 G. Greene 489 - 56 
Am Dec. 549 
-11-
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A simple reading of the above statute is 
sufficient to see that judgments per se are not 
excluded. 
But if it be construed that Section 78-12-44 
is limited strictly to contracts in their basic form., 
still many of our courts hold that a judgment can 
properly be called a contract. 30 A Am Jur., Sec 5, 
p. 161. 
uThe decisions are not in accord as to the 
statutes of a judgment as a contract. If a judgment 
can properly be considered a contract it is only in 
a recondite and remote sense of the term or in the 
ordinary sense of an agreement reached between 
persons to the terms of which their mutual assent 
has been given because usually the defendant has not 
volunarily assented. However., there are cases in 
which a judgment is called a contract or a contract 
of record., or a contract of the highest nature, or a 
specialty. -12 -
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Occasionally it has been said that a judgment 
is in the nature .of a contract or that the liability under 
a judgment is contractual in nature. Since a promise 
to pay. a judgment is implied in law it is sometime 
regarded as raising an implied contract. 
Thus it ·appears that in some senses and for 
s.ome purposes a judgment is treated and considered as 
a contract. -This is particularly true with reference 
to actions and remedies on contracts including the rem-
edy of attachment or garnishment. I' 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant bases its arguments on the two 
theories set out above. First that the common law 
allowed the tolling of the Statute of Limitations on obli-
gations by part payment or acknowledgment or by both. 
That there exists no specific statutory exclusion of 
judgments and that the law of the State of Utah would 
follow the majority of courts in the United States by 
-13-
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including judgments in the doctrine. That the 
respondent by signing an acknowledgment and paying 
$450.00 it acknowledged the original agreement and 
thereby waived whatever part of the Statute of Lim-
itations that had run. 
Second~ a specified statute 78-12-44., UCA 
1953., extends the time during which an action may be 
brought on any case founded on contract. Appellant 
alleges that promissory notes reduced to judgment 
are ''founded on contract'' (emphasis added) 
-14-
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS., BIRD AND HART 
and CLARENCE J. FROST 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Salt Lake City., Utah 
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